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Abstract 
A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education 
literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific 
mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied 
parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze 
some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, 
and Seattle. We show tha t these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two 
alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school 
choice issues. ( MHO C78, D61, D78, I20) 
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School choice is one of the widely discussed topics in education.1 It means giving parents the 
opportunity to choose the school their child will attend. Traditionally, children are assigned to 
public schools according to where they live. Wealthy parents already have school choice, because 
they can afford to move to an area with good schools, or they can enroll their child in a private 
school. Parents without such means, until recently, had no choice of school, and had to send 
their children to schools assigned to them by the district, regardless of the school quality or 
appropriateness for the children. As a result of these concerns, intra-district and inter-district 
choice programs have become increasingly popular in the past ten years.2 Intra-district choice 
allows parents to select schools throughout the district where they live, and inter-district choice 
allows them to send their children to public schools in areas outside their resident districts. In 
1987, Minnesota became the first state to oblige all its districts to establish an inter-district choice 
plan (Allyson M. Tucker and William F. Lauber, 1995). Today, several states offer inter-district 
and intra-district choice programs. 
Since it is not possible to assign each student to her top choice school, a central issue in 
school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism* While the education literature 
stresses the need for rigorous student assignment mechanisms and provides guidance for design 
(see for example Michael J. Alves and Charles V. Willie, 1990; Office of Educational Research 
and Improvement, 1992; and Timothy W. Young and Evans Clinchy, 1992, Ch. 6), it does not 
offer specific mechanisms.4 Many of the real-life school choice plans have protocols and guidelines 
for the student assignment without explicit procedures. Saul Yanofsky (see Office of Educational 
Research and Improvement, 1992, page 19), the former superintendent of the White Plains Public 
Schools, states 
! Milton Friedman (1955,1962) initiates the school choice literature. 
2For empirical investigation of various issues in school choice see Mark Schneider, Paul Teske and Melissa 
Marschall (2000). Another line of discussion has been on private school vouchers. See Caroline M. Hoxby (1994), 
Dennis Epple and Richard E. Romano (1998), Cecilia E. Rouse (1998), Thomas J. Nechyba (2000) and Raquel 
Fernandez and Richard Rogerson (2002). 
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 Indeed, one of the key obstacles identified by the critics of school choice concerns student selection to overde-
manded schools (see Donald Hirch (1994) page 14). 
4
 This is a major problem for school choice programs in other countries as well. For example, Gulam-Husien 
Mayet (1997), the former Chief Welfare Adviser for the Inner London Education Authority, indicates that the lack 
of synchronization and transparency in admissions to London public schools is a major problem for parents and 
local authorities. 
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You need to have a set of procedures that are very explicit 
The lack of rigorous procedures invites selective interpretation and it often results in evasive 
action by the students and their parents. Consider the following statement by the Supreme Court 
of Mississippi which affirms the judgement of a circuit court against a school district (Supreme 
Court of Mississippi, 2001) :5 
We agree that the denial of Gentry's transfer cannot be based on the alleged "middle-
school" transfer policy since there is no written record outlining its substance. Such 
a denial based on this vague Polly would clearly be arbitrary and capricious. 
Along similar lines consider the following summary of a court case concerning a school choice 
plan in Wisconsin (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2000) :6 
McMorrow v. Sta te Superintendent of Public Ins t ruc t ion 
Respondent applied under open enrollment, Wis. S t a t . 118.51 (1997-98), t o a t tend 
high school in a d i s t r i c t where he did not l i v e . His app l ica t ion was denied and 
appel lant affirmed, concluding tha t the denia l was supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence 
based on lack of c lass space; thus , i t was not a r b i t r a r y or unreasonable. The c i r c u i t 
court reversed. When three other continuing s tudents were accepted even though space 
was not ava i l ab l e , r e l i ance on c lass s ize guide l ines t o deny respondent enrollment 
was a r b i t r a r y . The court affirmed. There was no s u b s t a n t i a l evidence to support 
a p p e l l a n t ' s f indings of f ac t , and appel lant erroneously in t e rp re t ed s t a t u t o r y provis ions 
which gave preference to continuing s tudents only when spaces were ava i lab le in the 
f i r s t p lace . Under the s t a t u t e , when there were more appl icants than spaces ava i l ab l e , 
admission se l ec t ion was to be on a random b a s i s . Thus, accepting th ree s tudents in 
sp i t e of c lass s ize guidel ines and denying a fourth t h a t same exception without any 
explanation was a r b i t r a r y and unreasonable. 
5Pascagoula Municipal Separate School District v. W. Harvey Barton and Renee Barton, as Parents and Next 
Friends of William Gentry Barton, A Minor. No. 2000-CC-00035-SCT. Supreme Court of Mississippi. Decided on 
February 1, 2001. 
6
 Michael E. McMorrow, Petitioner-Respondent, v. State Super Intendent of Public Instructions, John T. Benson, 
Respondent-Appellant. No. 99-1288. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin. Decided on July 25, 2000. 
3 
Outcome: Judgement affirmed. State Superintendent of Public Instructions (SSPI) 
erred when i t found that the open enrollment statute supported preferential treatment 
of three continuing students when no class space was available; and when based on that 
finding, SSPI erroneously concluded that denying respondent's application for c lass 
space reasons was not arbitrary or unreasonable. 
Other school choice programs, such as those in Boston, Minneapols and Seattle, are accompa-
nied by explicit procedures. However each of these procedures have serious shortcomings. Under 
these procedures students with high priorities at specific schools lose their priorities unless they 
list these schools as their top choices. Consequently, students and their parents are forced to 
play very complicated admissions games, and often, misrepresenting their true preferences is in 
their best interest. This is not only confusing to students and their parents, but also results in 
inefficient allocation of school seats. 
In this paper we propose two competing student assignment mechanisms, each of which may be 
helpful in dealing with these critical school choice issues. A natural starting point is studying how 
similar allocation problems are handled in real life as well as in the mechanism design literature. 
A closely related problem is the allocation of dormitory rooms (or on-campus housing facilities) to 
students (Aanund Hylland and Richard Zeckhauser, 1979).7 The following mechanism, known as 
the random serial dictatorship, is almost exclusively used in real-life applications of these problems 
(Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Tayfun Sonmez, 1998, 1999): Order the students with a lottery and 
assign the first student her top choice, the next student her top choice among the remaining 
slots, and so on. This mechanism is not only Pareto efficient, but also strategy-proof (i.e., it 
cannot be manipulated by misrepresenting preferences), and it can accommodate any hierarchy 
of seniorities. So why not use the same mechanism to allocate school seats to students? The key 
difficulty with this approach is the following: Based on state and local laws, the priority ordering 
of a student can be different at different schools. For example 
7See also Lin Zhou (1990), Lars-Gunnar Svensson (1999), Haluk I. Ergin (2000), Szilvia Papai (2000), James 
Schummer (2000), Anna Bogomolnaia and Herve Moulin (2001), Eiichi Miyagawa (2001, 2002), Lars Ehlers (2002), 
Andrew McLennan (2002), Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Tayfun Sonmez (forthcoming), and Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus 
and Szilvia Papai (forthcoming). 
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- students who live in the attendance area of a school must be given priority for that school 
over students who do not live in the school's attendance area, 
- siblings of students already attending a school must be given priority, and 
- students requiring a bilingual program must be given priority in schools that offer such 
programs. 
Therefore a single lottery cannot be used to allocate school seats to students. It is this school-
specific priority feature of the problem that complicates the student assignment process. A student 
assignment mechanism should be flexible enough to give students different priorities at different 
schools. This point directs our attention to another closely related problem, namely the college 
admissions problem (David Gale and Lloyd S. Shapley, 1962). 
College admissions problem has been extensively studied (see Alvin E. Roth and Marilda A.O. 
Sotomayor (1990) for a survey) and successfully applied in British and American entry-level labor 
markets (see Roth, 1984, 1991). The central difference between the college admissions and school 
choice is that in college admissions, schools themselves are agents which have preferences over 
students, whereas in school choice, schools are merely "objects" to be consumed by the students. 
This distinction is important because the education of students is not and probably should not 
be organized in a market-like institution. A student should not be rejected by a school because of 
her personality or ability level. Despite this important difference between the two models, school 
preferences and school priorities are similar mathematical objects and the college admissions 
literature can still be very helpful in designing an appealing student admissions mechanism. 
The central notion in the college admissions literature is stability: There should be no un-
matched student-school pair (i,s) where student i prefers school s to her assignment and school 
s prefers student i to one or more of its admitted students. This mathematical property is equiv-
alent to the following appealing property in the context of school choice, where schools do not 
have preferences but instead they have priorities: There should be no unmatched student-school 
pair (i,s) where student i prefers school s to her assignment and she has higher priority than 
some other student who is assigned a seat at school s. Therefore a stable matching in the con-
text of college admissions eliminates justified envy in the context of school choice. Moreover it is 
5 
well-known that there exists a stable matching which is preferred to any stable matching by every 
student in the context of college admissions (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Since only the welfare 
of students matters in the context of school choice, this matching Pareto dominates any other 
matching that eliminates justified envy. This series of observations motivate the following student 
admissions mechanism to the school choice problem: Interpret school priorities as preferences and 
select the student-optimal stable matching of the induced college admissions problem. We refer 
to this mechanism as the Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism. Since 1998, a version 
of this mechanism is used in the United States hospital-intern market (Alvin E. Roth and Elliot 
Peranson, 1997, 1999). 
Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism has one additional very appealing feature: 
It is strategy-proof. That is, truthful preference revelation is a dominant strategy for the stu-
dents. In particular, students and their parents do not need to worry about losing their priorities 
as a consequence of reporting their truthful preferences. Gale-Shapley student optimal stable 
mechanism relieves students and their parents of devising complicated admissions strategies. 
However, Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism is not "problem free" in the context 
of school choice. While it Pareto dominates any other mechanism that eliminates justified envy, 
its outcome may still be Pareto dominated. That is because, there is a potential conflict between 
complete elimination of justified envy and Pareto efficiency (see Example 1 in Section II.A). 
This observation motivates the following question: Could there be a milder interpretation of 
the priorities which in turn does not cause a conflict with Pareto efficiency? The answer to 
this question is affirmative. Suppose that if student h has higher priority than student i2 for 
school s, that does not necessarily mean that she is entitled a seat at school s before student 
i2. It rather represents the opportunity to get in school s. If h has higher priority than i2, 
then she has a better opportunity to get in school s, other things being equal. This milder 
requirement is compatible with Pareto efficiency: Find all students, each of whom has the highest 
priority at a school. Among these individuals there is a group of students, all of whom can be 
assigned their top choices by trading their priorities. Assign all such students their top choices 
and once they are removed, proceed in a similar way starting with the students who have the 
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hlghhvt prlrrltlhv dmrng thh rhmdlnlng vtudhntv. Wh rhihr t r thlv Pdrhtr hfficlhnt mhchdnlvm 
dv thh top trading cycles mechanism. Whhn doo vchrrov hdvh thh vdmh prlrr l ty rrdhrlng +vdy dn 
rrdhrlng retdlnhd i r rm d crmmrn ortthry drdw,/ thlv mhchdnlvm rhduchv t r thh rdndrm vhrldo 
dlctdtrrvhlp whlch lv crmmrnoy uvhd ln thh door cdtlrn r i r n-cdmpuv hruvlng idcloltlhv. Thh t r p 
trddlng cycohv mhchdnlvm lv d ndturdo h xthnvlrn r i thlv mhchdnlvm/ d n hxthnvlrn whlch doorwv 
i r r dlffhrhnt prlrrltlhv d t dlffhrhnt vchrrov: Thh vlmpoh lnvlght r i dvvl gnlng rejhctv t r dghntv rnh 
dt d tlmh edvh d r n thhlr pr l r r l ty cdn eh vlmpoy hxthndhd ey dvvlgnlng rejhctv t r top trading 
cycles rnh cycoh d t d tlmh edvh d r n prlrrltlhv. Dv ln thh cdvh r i thh Gdoh-Shdpohy vtudhnt rptlmdo 
vtdeoh mhchdnlvm/ thh t r p trddlng cycohv mhchdnlvm lv dovr vtrdthgy-prrri. Thhrhirrh/ thh chrlch 
ehtwhhn thhvh twr crmphtlng mhchdnlvmv dhphndv r n thh vtructurh d nd lnthrprhtdtlrn r i thh 
prlrrltlhv. In vrmh d ppolcdtlrnv polcy-mdkhrv mdy rdnk crmpohth holmlndtlrn r i juvtlfihd hnvy 
ehirrh i uoo h fficlhncy/ thhn Gdoh-Shdpohy vtudhnt rptlmdo vtdeoh mhchdnlvm cdn eh uvhd ln thrvh 
cdvhv. Efficlhncy mdy eh rdnkhd hlghhr ey rthhrv/ dnd thh t rp trddlng cycohv mhchdnlvm cdn eh 
uvhd ln vuch dppolcdtlrnv. 
Onh r i thh mdjrr crnchrnv der ut thh lmpohmhntdtlrn r i vchrro chrlch podnv lv thdt thhy mdy 
rhvuot ln rdcldo d nd hthnlc vhgrhgdtlrn dt vchrrov. Bhcduvh r i thhvh crnchrnv/ chrlch podnv l n vrmh 
dlvtrlctv drh ol mlthd ey crurt-rrdhrhd dhvhgrhgdtlrn guldholnhv. Thlv vhrvlrn r i vchrro chrlch lv 
knrwn dv controlled choice. In mdny vchrro dlvtrlctv +vuch dv ln Brvt rn pr l rr t r 1999/ dv whoo dv 
ln Froumeuv d nd Mlnnhdpolv, crntroohd chrlch crnvtrdlntv drh lmpohmhnthd ey lmprvlng rdcldo 
qurtdv d t pueolc vchrrov. Dn lmprrtdnt ddvdntdgh r i e r th mhchdnlvmv lv thdt thhy cdn eh hdvloy 
mrdlfihd t r dccrmmrddth crntroohd chrlch crnvtrdlntv ey lmprvlng rdcldo qurtdv. Mrrhrvhr/ thh 
mrdlfihd mhchdnlvmv d rh vtloo vtrdthgy-prrri d nd thh mrdlfihd t r p trddlng cycohv mhchdnlvm lv 
crnvtrdlnhd hfficlhnt. 
Thh mhchdnlvm dhvlgn dpprrdch hdv rhchntoy ehhn vhry irultiuo l n mdny rhdo-lih rhvrurch 
doorcdtlrn prreohmv. Imprrtdnt hxdmpohv lncoudh thh dhvlgn r i I F F vphctrum ductlrnv +vhh Jrhn 
McMloodn +1994,/ Phthr Frdmtrn +1995,/ R. Prhvtrn McDihh d nd Jrhn McMloodn +1996,/ Pduo 
Mlogrrm +5333,, dnd thh rh-dhvlgn r i D mhrlcdn hrvpltdo-lnthrn mdrkht +vhh Rr th +5335,/ Rr th 
dnd Phrdnvrn +1999,,. Thlv pdphr/ t r thh ehvt r i r ur knrwohdgh/ lv thh firvt pdphr t r dpprrdch 
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the school choice problem from a mechanism-design perspective. We believe this approach may 
be helpful in some critical school choice issues. 
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: In Section I, we introduce the school 
choice model, give examples of real-life school admissions mechanisms, and illustrate their short-
comings. In Section II, we introduce the two proposed mechanisms and analyze their properties. 
In Section III, we introduce controlled choice, modify the proposed mechanisms, and analyze 
them. In Section IV, we conclude. Finally, we present an example and include the omitted proofs 
in the Appendix. 
I School Choice 
In a school choice problem there are a number of students, each of whom should be assigned a 
seat at one of a number of schools. Each school has a maximum capacity but there is no shortage 
of the total seats. Each student has strict preferences over all schools, and each school has a strict 
priority ordering of all students. Here, priorities do not represent school preferences but they are 
imposed by state or local laws. For example, in several states a student who has a sibling already 
attending a school is given priority for that school by the education codes. Similarly, students 
who live within walking proximity of a school are given priority. For each school, the priority 
between two students who are identical in each relevant aspect is usually determined by a lottery. 
The school choice problem is closely related to the well-known college admissions problem 
introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). The college admissions problem has been extensively 
studied (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a survey) and successfully applied in the American 
and British entry-level labor markets (see Roth, 1984,1991). The key difference between the two 
problems is that in school choice, schools are objects to be "consumed" by the students, whereas 
in college admissions, schools themselves are agents who have preferences over students. 
The outcome of a school choice problem is an assignment of schools to students such that each 
student is assigned one school and no school is assigned to more students than its capacity. We 
refer each such outcome as a matching. A matching is Pareto efficient if there is no other matching 
which assigns each student a weakly better school and at least one student a strictly better school. 
; 
A student assignment mechanism is a systematic procedure that selects a matching for each school 
choice problem. A student assignment mechanism is a direct mechanism if it requires students to 
reveal their preferences over schools and selects a matching based on these submitted preferences 
and student priorities. A student assignment mechanism is Pareto efficient if it always selects a 
Pareto efficient matching. A direct mechanism is strategy-proof if no student can ever benefit by 
unilaterally misrepresenting her preferences. 
Since it is not possible to assign each student her top choice, a central issue in school choice is 
the design of a student assignment mechanism (Donald Hirch 1994). In this paper we propose two 
direct student assignment mechanisms with different strenghts. Depending on the priorities of 
polcy-makers, either mechanism can be practically implemented in real-life applications of school 
choice problems. Before we introduce and analyze these mechanisms, we describe and analyze 
some real-life student assignment mechanisms. 
A Boston Student Assignment Mechanism 
One of the common mechanisms is the direct mechanism that is used by the City of Boston. 
The mechanism that we next describe has been in use in Boston since July, 1999. Prior to that 
another version of the same mechanism that imposed racial quotas was in use (United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 2002).8 Variants of the same mechanism are 
currently used in Lee County, Florida,9 Minneapolis (Steven Glazerman and Robert H. Meyer, 
1994), and Seattle,10 among other school districts. 
Boston student assignment mechanism works as follows:11 
1. Each student submits a preference ranking of the schools. 
2. For each school a priority ordering is determined according to the following hierarchy: 
. First priority: sibling and walk zone. 
"Boston's Children First, et al. v. Boston School Committee, et al. Civil Action Number: 99-11330-RGS. 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Decided on January 25, 2002. 
9Seehttp://www.lee.kl2.n.us/dept/plan/Choice/faqs.htm#13 
10See page 12 of http://www.seattleschools.org/area/eso/elementaryenrollmentguide20022003.pdf 
"See http://boston.kl2.ma.us/teach/assign.asp. See also the case Boston's Children First, et al. v. Boston 
School Committee cited in Footnote 7. 
< 
. Second priority: sibling. 
. Third priority: walk zone. 
. Fourth priority: other students. 
Students in the same priority group are ordered based on a previously announced lottery. 
3. The final phase is the student assignment based on preferences and priorities: 
Round 1: In Round 1 only the first choices of the students are considered. For each school, 
consider the students who have listed it as their first choice and assign seats of the school 
to these students one at a time following their priority order until either there are no seats 
left or there is no student left who has listed it as her first choice. 
Round 2: Consider the remaining students. In Round 2 only the second choices of these 
students are considered. For each school with still available seats, consider the students who 
have listed it as their second choice and assign the remaining seats to these students one at 
a time following their priority order until either there are no seats left or there is no student 
left who has listed it as her second choice. 
In general at 
Round k: Consider the remaining students. In Round k only the k t h choices of these students 
are considered. For each school with still available seats, consider the students who have 
listed it as their k t h choice and assign the remaining seats to these students one at a time 
following their priority order until either there are no seats left or there is no student left 
who has listed it as her k t h choice. 
The major difficulty with the Boston student assignment mechanism is that it is not strategy-
proof. Even if a student has very high priority at school s, unless she lists it as her top choice she 
loses her priority to students who have listed s as their top choices. Hence the Boston student 
assignment mechanism gives very strong incentives to students and their parents to misrepresent 
their preferences by improving ranks of those schools for which they have high priority.12 This 
point is also observed by Glazerman and Meyer (1994) for Minneapols: 
12
 If a mechanism is not strategy-proof, that does not necessarilly mean that it can be easily manipulated. For 
10 
It may be optimal for some families to be strategic in listing their school choices. For 
example, if a parent thinks that their favorite school is oversubscribed and they have 
a close second favorite, they may try to avoid "wasting" their first choice on a very 
popular school and instead list their number two school first. 
Another difficulty with the Boston student assignment mechanism concerns efficiency. If 
students submit their true preferences, then the outcome of the Boston student assignment mech-
anism is Pareto-efficient. But since many families are likely to misrepresent their preferences, its 
outcome is unlikely to be Pareto efficient. 
B Columbus Student Assignment Mechanism 
The mechanism used by Columbus City School District is not a direct mechanism and it works 
as follows:13 
1. Each student may apply to up to 3 different schools. 
2. For some schools, seats are guaranteed for students who live in the school's regular assign-
ment area and the priority among remaining applicants is determined by a random lottery. 
For the remaining schools, the priority among all applicants is determined by a random 
lottery. 
3. For each school, available seats are offered to students with the highest priority by a lottery 
office and the remaining applications are put on a waiting list. After receiving an offer a 
student has 3 days to accept or decline an offer. If she accepts an offer, she is assigned a 
seat; she then must decline offers from other schools and she is removed from the waiting 
list of other schools to which she has applied. As soon as seats become available at schools 
because of declined offers, the lottery office makes offers to students on the waiting lists. 
example, Alvin E. Roth and Urial G. Rothblum (1999) show that although the hospital-optimal stable mechanism 
can be manipulated by the interns, it is unlikely that such an attempt will be successful and hence truthful 
preference revelation is still in the best interest of the interns. In case of the Boston student assignment mechanism, 
the situation is quite different and the parents are warned to be careful how they use their top choices. 
13Seehttp://www.columbus.kl2.oh.us/applications/FAQ.nsf/(deadline)?openview#19 
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The Columbus student assignment mechanism is similar to the entry-level market for clinical 
psychologists in the United States (see Alvin E. Roth and Xiaolin Xing (1997)). The market 
for clinical psychologists is more decentralized and each employer makes its offers via telephone, 
whereas a centralized lottery office makes all offers on behalf of each school for student assignment 
at Columbus. 
As in the case of the Boston student assignment mechanism, the optimal application strategy 
of students is unclear under the Columbus student assignment mechanism. When a family gets 
an offer from its second or third choice, it is unclear whether the optimal strategy is declining 
this offer or accepting it. Similarly, the optimal list of schools to apply for is unclear. Hence in 
Columbus families are forced to play a very difficult game on a very crucial issue. 
Another major difficulty with the Columbus student assignment mechanism concerns effi-
ciency: Consider two students, each of whom hold an offer from the other's first choice. Since 
they do not know whether they will receive better offers, they may as well accept these offers, 
and this in turn yields an inefficient matching. 
II Two Competing Mechanisms 
We are now ready to propose two alternative mechanisms to the school choice problem. 
A Gale-Shapley Student Optimal Stable Mechanism 
As we have already emphasized, the school choice problem is closely related to the college ad-
missions problem: In school choice, schools are not agents and they have priorities over students, 
whereas in college admissions, schools are agents and they have preferences over students. One 
promising idea is interpreting school priorities as preferences and applying the following version 
of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962): 
Step 1: Each student proposes to her first choice. Each school tentatively assigns its seats to its 
proposers one at a time following their priority order. Any remaining proposers are rejected. 
In general, at 
Step k: Each student who was rejected in the previous step proposes to her next choice. Each 
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school considers the students it has been holding together with its new proposers and tentatively 
assigns its seats to these students one at a time following their priority order. Any remaining 
proposers are rejected. 
The algorithm terminates when no student proposal is rejected and each student is assigned 
her final tentative assignment. We refer to the induced direct mechanism as Gale-Shapley student 
optimal stable mechanism. (See the Appendix for a detailed example.) 
Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism is used in Hong Kong to assign college seats 
to high school graduates, and since 1998, a version of it is used in the American hospital-intern 
market (Roth and Peranson, 1997, 1999). 
The central notion in the college admissions literature is stability, which is equivalent to the 
following natural requirement in the context of school choice: There should be no unmatched 
student-school pair (i,s) where student i prefers school s to her assignment and she has higher 
priority than some other student who is assigned a seat at school s. Therefore, a stable matching 
in the context of college admissions eliminates justified envy in the context of school choice. 
As it is suggested by its name, Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism is stable in 
the context of college admissions and therefore it eliminates justified envy in the context of school 
choice. It also has a number of additional very plausible properties. 
PROPOSITION 1 (Gale and Shapley, 1962): Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism 
Pareto dominates any other mechanism that eliminates justified envy. 
PROPOSITION 2 (Lester E. Dubins and David A. Freeman, 1981; Roth, 1982): Gale-Shapley 
student optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof. 
Nevertheless, Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism is not "problem free." The 
following example due to Roth (1982) shows that there is a potential trade-off between stability 
and Pareto efficiency. 
EXAMPLE 1: There are three students i i , i 2 , i 3 and three schools 51,52,53, each of which has 
only one seat. The priorities of schools and the preferences of students are as follows: 
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S i : h - i 3 - 12 h : S2 51 S3 
s 2 : i 2 - h - h 12 • s i s2 S3 
s3:i2-ii- is is • si s2 s3 
Let us interpret the school priorities as school preferences and consider the associated college 
admissions problem. In this case there is only one stable matching: 
( h h is \ 
\ 51 S2 S3 J 
But this matching is Pareto dominated by 
( h h is \ 
V S2 5i S3 J ' 
Here agents h and i2 have the highest priorities for schools si and s2 respectively. So there is 
no way student h can be assigned a school that is worse than school si and hence she shall be 
assigned either s2 or si. Similarly there is no way student i2 can be assigned a school that is 
worse than school s2 and hence she shall be assigned either si or s2. Thus students h and i2 
should share schools si and s2 among themselves. Stability forces them to share these schools 
in a Pareto inefficient way: This is because if students h and i2 are assigned schools s2 and si 
respectively, then we have a situation where student i3 prefers school si to her assignment s3 and 
she has a higher priority for school s2 than student i2 does. 
As Example 1 shows, complete elimination of justified envy may conflict with Pareto effi-
ciency.14 If policy-makers rank complete elimination of justified envy above Pareto efficiency, 
then Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism is a very well-behaved mechanism.15 
14
 In many school districts, strict priorities are obtained with the help of a single tie-breaking lottery in addition 
to fundamental policy considerations. In others, strict priorities are obtained with the help of several tie-breaking 
lotteries, typically one for each school. Using a single tie-breaking lottery might be a better idea in school districts 
that adopt Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism, since this practice eliminates part of the inefficiency: In 
this case, any inefficiency will be necessarilly caused by a fundamental policy consideration and not by an unlucky 
lottery draw. In other words, the tie-breaking will not result in additional efficiency loss if it is carried out through a 
single lottery (while that is likely to happen if the tie-breaking is independently carried out across different schools). 
15
 Recently Ergin (forthcoming) characterizes the conditions under which there is no conflict between complete 
elimination of justified envy and Pareto efficiency. 
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B Top Trading Cycles Mechanism 
The stability notion strictly eliminates all justified envy. Next we consider a milder interpretation 
of the priorities, which in turn does not cause a conflict with Pareto efficiency. Suppose that if 
student h has higher priority than student i2 for school s, that does not necessarily mean that 
she is entitled a seat at school s before student i2. It rather represents the opportunity to get into 
school s. If h has higher priority than i2, then she has a better opportunity to get into school s, 
other things being equal. 
Next, we introduce a competing mechanism which is Pareto efficient but which does not 
completely eliminate justified envy. Loosely speaking, the intuition for this mechanism is that 
it starts with students who have the highest priorities, and allows them to trade the schools 
for which they have the highest priorities in case a Pareto improvement is possible. Once these 
students are removed, it proceeds in a similar way starting with the students who have the highest 
priorities among those who remain. The top trading cycles mechanism is a direct mechanism and 
for any priorities and reported preferences it finds a matching via the following the top trading 
cycles algorithm" 
Step 1: Assign a counter for each school which keeps track of how many seats are still available 
at the school. Initially set the counters equal to the capacities of the schools. Each student 
points to her favorite school under her announced preferences. Each school points to the student 
who has the highest priority for the school. Since the number of students and schools are finite, 
there is at least one cycle. (A cycle is an ordered list of distinct schools and distinct students 
(s1,i1,s2,...,sk,ik) where Sl points to h, h points to s2, ..., sk points to ik, ik points to Sl.) 
Moreover, each school can be part of at most one cycle. Similarly, each student can be part of 
at most one cycle. Every student in a cycle is assigned a seat at the school she points to and is 
removed. The counter of each school in a cycle is reduced by one and if it reduces to zero, the 
school is also removed. Counters of all other schools stay put. 
In general, at 
16This algorithm is inspired by Gale's top trading cycles algorithm which is used to find the unique core allocation 
(Alvin E. Roth and Andrew Postlewaite, 1977) in the context of housing markets (Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf 
, 1974). 
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Step k: Each remaining student points to her favorite school among the remaining schools and 
each remaining school points to the student with highest priority among the remaining students. 
There is at least one cycle. Every student in a cycle is assigned a seat at the school that she 
points to and is removed. The counter of each school in a cycle is reduced by one and if it reduces 
to zero the school is also removed. Counters of all other schools stay put. 
The algorithm terminates when all students are assigned a seat. Note that there can be no 
more steps than the cardinality of the set of students.(See the Appendix for a detailed example.) 
The top trading cycles algorithm simply trades priorities of students among themselves starting 
with the students with highest priorities. In the very special case where all schools have the same 
priority ordering (for example, when all schools use the same ordering from a single lottery draw) 
this mechanism reduces to the serial dictatorship induced by this priority ordering. That is, the 
first student is assigned her top choice, the next student is assigned her top choice among the 
remaining seats, and so on. Therefore, the top trading cycles mechanism is a generalization of 
this mechanism, extended in a way that allows for different priorities at different schools. 
A variant of the top trading cycles mechanism is proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 
(1999) in a model of house allocation with existing tenants. In that model, there are existing 
tenants who have squatting rights over their current houses, and there are newcomers and vacant 
houses. The version proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1999) is a special case of the 
mechanism presented here: In that version, there is a fixed priority ordering for all houses but 
this ordering is slightly modified for each occupied house by inserting its current occupant at the 
top. 
In a closely related paper, Szilvia Papai (2000) independently introduces the hierarchical 
exchange rules, which is a wider class of mechanisms. She characterizes the members of this 
class to be the only mechanisms that are Pareto efficient, group strategy-proof, (i.e., immune to 
preference manipulation by a group of agents) and reallocation proof (i.e., immune to manipulation 
by misrepresenting the preferences and swapping the objects by a pair of agents). 
The top trading cycles mechanism has a number of very plausible properties. First of all, 
unlike the Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism, it is Pareto efficient. 
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PROPOSITION 3: The top trading cycles mechanism is Pareto efficient. 
Another key desirable feature of the top trading cycles mechanism is that, as in the case of 
Gale-Shapley student optimal mechanism, it is strategy-proof. Therefore truthful preference reve-
lation is a dominant strategy for all students. In particular, unlike the Boston student assignment 
mechanism, students do not need to hesitate on reporting their truthful preferences in fear of 
losing their priorities. Therefore both our proposed mechanisms release an important burden of 
finding the optimal application strategy over the shoulders of students and their parents. 
PROPOSITION 4: The top trading cycles mechanism is strategy-proof. 
The intuition for the strategy-proofness of the top trading cycles mechanism is very simple. 
Suppose that a student leaves the algorithm at step k when she reports her true preferences. 
Since she points to the best available seat at each step of the algorithm, all the seats that she 
prefers leaves the algorithm before step k and by misrepresenting her preferences she cannot 
alter the cycles that has formed at any step before step k. So these better seats will leave the 
algorithm before she does whether she reports her true preferences or fake preferences. Thus she 
can only hurt herself by a manipulation. Strategy-proofness of the core mechanism for housing 
markets (Roth, 1982b), the top trading cycles mechanism for house allocation with existing tenants 
(Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1999), and the hierarchical exchange functions (Papai, 2000) are 
all based on the same critical observation. 
C Which Mechanism Shall Be Chosen? 
As we have already indicated, both mechanisms are strategy-proof, so the choice between them 
depends on the structure and interpretation of the priorities. In some applications, polcy-makers 
may rank complete elimination of justified envy before full efficiency, and Gale-Shapley student 
optimal stable mechanism can be used in those cases. University admissions in Turkey is one 
such application (Michel Balinski and Tayfun Sonmez, 1999). In Turkey, priorities for university 
departments are obtained via a centralized exam and complete elimination of justified envy is 
imposed by law. Depending on the application, Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism 
may have additional advantages. For example, consider a city which implements separate intra-
4 : 
district choice programs with an eventual target of eliminating the borders and switching to an 
inter-district choice program. Furthermore, suppose that cross-district priorities will be lower 
than within-district priorities in the eventual program. In such applications, transition to an 
inter-district program is likely to move smoother under the Gale-Shapley student optimal stable 
mechanism: The outcome produced by the Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism un-
der the inter-district program Pareto dominates the outcome produced by separate intra-district 
choice programs (each of which use the Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism). That is 
because the outcome produced by separate intra-district choice programs is still stable under the 
inter-district choice program, provided that cross-district priorities are lower than within-district 
priorities. Hence, no student can possibly suffer from a transition to the inter-district choice 
program under the Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism. It is easy to construct an 
example where the transition to an inter-district choice program hurts some students under the 
top trading cycles mechanism.17 
In other applications, the top trading cycles mechanism may be more appealing. School choice 
in Columbus is one such application. Recall the school priorities in Columbus: For some schools, 
students in the school's regular assignment area have high priority and they are all guaranteed 
a seat and the priority among the remaining low-priority students is determined by a random 
lottery. For the remaining schools, all students are in the same priority group and the priority 
between them is determined by a random lottery. Under the top trading cycles mechanism, 
students who have high priorities for their local schools are all guaranteed seats that are at least 
as good, provided that they truthfully report their preferences. Any instability produced by the 
top trading cycles mechanism is necessarily due to the randomly obtained priorities and in that 
case a milder interpretation of the priorities may be more appealing. In other cases the choice 
between the two mechanisms may be less clear and it depends on the polcy priorities of the 
polcy-makers. 
17
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee who brought this observation to our attention. 
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I l l Controlled Choice 
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jdtlrn juldholnhs1 Ln Mlssrurl/ ir r hxdmpoh/ St1 Lruls dnd Kdnsds Clty must reshrvh strlct rdcldo 
juldholnhs irr thh podchmhnt ri studhnts ln clty schrros1 Thhrh d rh slmlodr crnstrdlnts ln rthhr 
cruntrlhs ds whoo1 Frr hxdmpoh l n Enjodnd/ Clty Thchnrorjy Croohjhs drh rhqulrhd t r ddmlt d 
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r i thh crmmunlty ln thh cdtchmhnt drhd (Drndod Hlrch/ 4994/ pdjh 453,1 
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qurtds dt pueolc schrros1 Frr hxdmpoh/ prlrr t r Juoy 4999/ d vhrslrn r i thh Brstrn studhnt 
dssljnmhnt mhchdnlsm whlch ushs rdcldo qurtds wds ln ush ln thh Clty ri Brstrn1 Slmlodroy/ 
ln Croumeus dnd Mlnnhdpolis/ crntroohd chrlch crnstrdlnts drh lmpohmhnthd ey lmprslnj rdcldo 
qurtds1 Thhsh qurtds mdy eh phrihctoy rljld r r thhy mdy eh flhxleoh1 Frr hxdmpoh/ ln Mlnnhdpols/ 
thh dlstrlct ls doorwhd t r j r der vh r r ehorw thh dlstrlct-wldh dvhrdjh h nroomhnt rdths ey up t r 
45 phrchnt prlnts ln dhthrmlnlnj thh rdcldo qurtds1 Sr crnsldhr d schrro dlstrlct ln Mlnnhdpolis/ 
whhrh thh d vhrdjh h nroomhnt rdths ri mdjrrlty studhnts vhrsus mlnrrlty studhnts drh 93( / 4 3 ( 
rhsphctlvhoy/ d nd crnsldhr d schrro wlth 433 shdts1 Rdcldo qurtds irr thls schrro d rh 75 irr mdjrrlty 
studhnts/ dnd 55 irr mlnrrlty studhnts1 
Brth Gdoh-Shdpohy studhnt rptlmdo stdeoh mhchdnlsm dnd thh trp trddlnj cycohs mhchdnlsm 
cdn eh hdsloy mrdlfihd t r dccrmmrddth crntroohd chrlch crnstrdlnts ey lmprslnj typh-sphclfic 
qurtds1 
A Gale-Shapley Student Optimal Stable Mechanism with Type-Specific Quo-
tas 
Supprsh thdt thhrh d rh dlffhrhnt typhs r i studhnts dnd hdch studhnt ehornjs t r rnh typh1 Li thh 
crntroohd chrlch crnstrdlnts drh phrihctoy rljld thhn thhrh l s nr nhhd t r mrdliy thh Gdoh-Shdpohy 
studhnt rptlmdo stdeoh mhchdnlsm1 Frr hdch typh r i studhnts/ rnh cdn shpdrdthoy lmpohmhnt thh 
mhchdnlsm ln rrdhr t r doorcdth thh shdts thdt drh rhshrvhd hxcouslvhoy irr thdt typh1 Whhn thh 
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controlled choice constraints are flexible, consider the following modification of the Gale-Shapley 
student optimal stable mechanism that is studied by Abdulkadiroglu (2002) in the context of 
college admissions with affirmative action:18 
Step 1: Each student proposes to her first choice. Each school tentatively assigns its seats to its 
proposers one at a time following their priority order. If the quota of a type fills, the remaining 
proposers of that type are rejected and the tentative assignment proceeds with the students of 
the other types. Any remaining proposers are rejected. 
In general, at 
Step k: Each student who was rejected in the previous step proposes to her next choice. Each 
school considers the students it has been holding together with its new proposers and tentatively 
assigns its seats to these students one at a time following their priority order. If the quota of a 
type fills, the remaining proposers of that type are rejected and the tentative assignment proceeds 
with the students of the other types. Any remaining proposers are rejected. 
This modified mechanism satisfies the following version of the fairness requirement: If there 
is an unmatched student-school pair (i, s) where student i prefers school s to her assignment and 
she has higher priority than some other student j who is assigned a seat at school s then 
1. students i and j are of different types, and 
2. the quota for the type of student i is full at school s. 
As an implication, the modified mechanism eliminates all justified envy between students 
of the same type. The above fairness requirement is equivalent to stability in the context of 
college admissions with affirmative action. Moreover, truthful preference revelation is a dominant 
strategy for the students under the modified Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism as 
well (Abdulkadiroglu, 2002). 
18Abdulkadiroglu (2002) shows that flexible controlled choice constraints induce substitutable preferences 
(Alexander S. Kelso, Jr. and Vincent P. Crawford, 1982) in the context of college admissions. That is because, the 
role played by the flexible controlled choice constraints in the present context is analogous to the role of discrim-
inatory quotas (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Proposition 5.22) in the context of college admissions problems. 
Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism for the general case of substitutable preferences is due to Roth 
(1991). 
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PROPOSITION 5: Gale-Shapley student optimal mechanism with type-specific quotas is strategy-
proof. 
In many real-life applications of controlled choice, there are only two types of students (for 
example, majority students and minority students). In such applications, the modified mechanism 
is essentially a direct application of the original mechanism with the following twist: Consider 
a school s with q seats and which has quotas of
 qi, q2 for type 1, type 2 students respectively. 
Clearly q >
 qi, q > q2 and qi + q2 > q. In school s, 
. q-q2 seats are reserved exclusively for type 1 students, 
• ? - ? i seats are reserved exclusively for type 2 students, 
. and the remaining
 qi + q2 - q seats are reserved for either type of students. 
So it is as if there are three different schools s\ s2, s3 where 
. school s1 has q - q2 seats and student priorities are obtained from the original priorities by 
removing type 2 students and making them unacceptable at school s\ 
. school s2 has q -
 qi seats and student priorities are obtained from the original priorities by 
removing type 1 students and making them unacceptable at school s2, and 
. school s3 has qi+q2-q seats and student priorities are same as the original priorities. 
Whenever there are two types of students, our modified mechanism 
. divides each school into three schools as explained above, 
. extends each student preferences as follows: 
- for any school s, s1 is preferred to s2, which is preferred to s3, 
- for any pair of schools s,t, if s is preferred to t then each of s\ s2, s3 is preferred to 
each of t\t2,t3, 
and 
. selects the student optimal stable matching of the induced college admissions problem. 
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B Top Trading Cycles Mechanism with Type-Specific Quotas 
As in the case of Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism, there is no need to modify 
the top trading cycles mechanism when controlled choice constraints are perfectly rigid. One 
can implement the top trading cycles mechanism separately for each type of students. When the 
controlled choice constraints are flexible, the top trading cycles mechanism can be modified as 
follows: For each school, in addition to the original counter which keeps track of how many seats 
are available, include a type-specific counter for each type of students. 
Step 1: For each school, set the counter equal to the capacity of the school and set each type-
specific counter equal to the quota of the associated type of students. Each student points to her 
favorite school among those which has room for her type (i.e. with a positive counter reading 
for her type). Each school points to the student with highest priority for that school. There is 
at least one cycle. Every student in a cycle is assigned a seat at the school she points to and is 
removed. The counter of each school in a cycle is reduced by one. Depending on the student it 
is assigned to, the associated type-specific counter is reduced by one as well. All other counters 
stay put. In case the counter of a school (not the type-specific ones) reduces to zero, the school is 
removed as well. If there is at least one remaining student, then we proceed with the next step. 
In general, at 
Step k: Each remaining student points to her favorite remaining school among those which has 
room for her type, and each remaining school points to the student with the highest priority 
among remaining students. There is at least one cycle. Every student in a cycle is assigned a seat 
at the school that she points to and is removed. The counter of each school in a cycle is reduced 
by one and depending on the student it is assigned to, the associated type-specific counter is 
reduced by one as well. All other counters stay put. In case the counter of a school reduces to 
zero, the school is removed. If there is at least one remaining student, then we proceed with the 
next step. 
There can be efficiency losses in both mechanisms due to the controlled choice constraints. A 
matching is constrained efficient if there is no other matching that satisfies the controlled choice 
constraints, and which assigns all students a weakly better school and at least one student a 
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strictly better school. The outcome of the modified top trading cycles mechanism is constrained 
efficient. 
PROPOSITION 6: The top trading cycles mechanism with type-specific quotas is constrained 
efficient. 
Moreover, truthful preference revelation is still a dominant strategy under the modified mech-
anism. 
PROPOSITION 7: The top trading cycles mechanism with type-specific quotas is strategy-proof. 
IV Conclusion 
The Office of the Educational Research and Improvement (1992, pages 19-20) emphasizes the 
following seven factors on which student assignment decisions should be based: 
1. Racial Balance: Student assignment polcies should respect the racial and ethnic proportions 
of the district. 
2. Instructional Capacity: Student assignment policies must take into consideration the danger 
of creating an imbalance in the instructional capacity of a school. 
3. Replication Efforts: Popular programs should be replicated and undersubscribed schools be 
closed and then reopened as distinctive schools created by collective efforts. 
4. Space Availability: Schools must outline classroom use needs long before the school year 
begins. 
5. Neighborhood School Priority: A percentage of slots in a school should be reserved for 
neighborhood families, as long as racial balance is maintained, to allow continuity for the 
students and a connection for the school to the neighborhood. 
6. Preference for Siblings: As a convenience for parents and to promote the sharing of school 
experience between brothers and sisters, preference for sibling requests should be given some 
priority. 
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7. Gender Balance Considerations for Certain Schools. 
Among these, items 1,2,5,6, and 7 concern the design of a student assignment mechanism. Both 
mechanisms that we propose respect each of these factors: Racial balance and gender balance can 
be achieved through type-specific quotas, instructional capacity overload is achieved through reg-
ular capacities, neighborhood school priority and preference for siblings can be achieved through 
school specific priorities. 
In addition to these factors, Alves and Willie [1990], engineers of the Boston Controlled Choice 
Plan, emphasize the following objectives as essential elements of an effective controlled choice plan: 
1. Eliminating, to the extent practical, all individual school attendance boundaries and/or 
geocodes. 
2. Allowing parents and students to make multiple school selections but with no guarantee 
that they will obtain their first-choice schools or programs of choice. 
3. Ensuring complete honesty and integrity in the disposition of all final assignment decisions. 
Both mechanisms conform with these objectives as well: Students rank all schools (of course 
without any guarantee of getting their top choices) and once the polcies concerning school prior-
ities are announced and these priorities determined, the final outcome is deterministic and does 
not leave any room for manipulation. 
School choice is becoming increasingly common in the United States. Cities having adopted 
school choice plans include Boston, Cambridge, Champaign, Columbus, Hartford, Little Rock, 
Minneapols, Rockville, Seattle, White Plains, and parts of New York. Recent laws in several 
states require each school district to establish an intra-district school choice plan. Similarly, 
recent laws in Florida require each school district to design a school choice plan, even if they do 
not implement it. An important difficulty in designing such plans is the choice of an appealing 
student assignment mechanism. Many of the school choice plans that we find have protocols and 
guidelines for the assignment of students without explicit procedures. This gap offers opportunities 
to manipulate these controlled choice programs and results in appeals by unsatisfied parents. 
Jeffrey R. Henig (1994, page 212) states 
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The first step that districts must take to ensure fair implementation of choice within 
and among schools is to make the criteria for accepting and rejecting transfer requests 
clear and public. Vaguely worded references to "maintaining racial balance," "avoiding 
overcrowding," and meeting children's "individualized needs" invite selective interpre-
tation unless they are accompanied by practical definitions. 
Other school choice programs, such as those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapols and Seattle 
are accompanied by deterministic student assignment mechanisms but these mechanisms are all 
vulnerable to preference manipulation. As a result, students and their families face a difficult 
task of finding optimal admissions strategies. Adopting either the Gale-Shapley student optimal 
stable mechanism or the top trading cycles mechanism may provide a practical solution to some 
of these critical school choice issues. 
D Dppendix 
EXAMPLE 2: This example illustrates the dynamics of the Gale-Shapley student optimal stable 
mechanism and the top trading cycles mechanism. There are eight students h,... ,i8 and four 
schools 5 i , . . . ,
 S4. Schools Sl,s2 have 2 seats each and schools s3,sA have 3 seats each. The 
priorities of the schools and the preferences of the students are as follows: 
5i : h - i2 - h - U - k - k - 17 - k 
s 2 : h - h - u - h - i 7 - i 2 - h - k 
S3-.iD-i3-ii-i7-i2-is-i6- U 
S4:i6-i8-i7-U-i2-i3-iD- h 
h J2 k U k k J7 is 
52 Si S3 S3 Si S 4 Si Si 
Si S2 S 2 S 4 S 3 Si S 2 S2 
53 S3 Si Si S 4 S2 S 3 S 4 
5 4 S 4 S 4 S2 S 2 S3 S 4 S3 
GALE-SHAPLEY STUDENT OPTIMAL STABLE MECHANISM: 
Step 1: Students i2, iD, i7, i8 propose to school Sl, student h proposes to school s2, students i3, 
U propose to school s3 and student i6 proposes to school s4. 
School si tentatively assigns its seats to students i2,iD and rejects students i7, i8. Since school 
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5i is the only school with excess proposals, all other students are tentatively assigned seats at 
schools that they propose. 
Step 2: Having been rejected at Step 1, each of students i7, i8 propose to school s2 which is 
their next choice. School s2 considers student h whom it has been holding together with its new 
proposers i7, i8. School s2 tentatively assigns its seats to students i8, i7 and rejects student h. 
Step 3: Having been rejected at Step 2, student h proposes to school
 Sl which is her next choice. 
School 5i considers students i2, iD whom it has been holding together with its new proposer ix. 
School 5i tentatively assigns its seats to students h, i2 and rejects student iD. 
Step 4: Having been rejected at Step 3, student iD proposes to school s3 which is her next choice. 
School 53 considers students i3, u whom it has been holding together with its new proposer iD. 
Since school 53 has 3 seats, it tentatively assigns its seats to these students. 
Since no student proposal is rejected at Step 4, the algorithm terminates. Each student is 
assigned her final tentative assignment: 
# 
i\ 12 h U h k i? is 
Sl 51 5 3 5 3 5 3 54 52 52 $ 
. 
TOP TRADING CYCLES MECHANISM: 
Let cSl, cS2, cS3 and cS4 indicate the counters of the schools. 
Vwhs 4 = cSl(l) = 2 
si 
fv2+4, @ 5 
\ \ 















\ * \u 
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There are two cycles in Step 1: (Sl, h, s2, i3, 53, iD) and (54, i6). Therefore students h,i3,iD, i6 duh 
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assigned one slot at schools s2, s3, su s4 respectively and removed. Since every school participates 
in a cycle, all counters are reduced by one for the next step. 
Vwhs 5 = cSl(2) = 1 
si 
• — 
cS2(2) = 1 
%2 S2 




i7 I d* 
S 4 S3 
c S 4 (2)=2 cS3(2) = 2 
Figure 2 
There is only one cycle in Step 2: ( 5 l , i 2 ) . Therefore student i2 is assigned one slot at school Sl 
and removed. The counter of school
 Sl is reduced by one to zero and it is removed. All other 
counters stay put. 











c S 4 (3)=2 cS3(3) = 2 
Figure 3 
There is only one cycle in Step 3: (s3,i7,s2,u). Therefore students i7,u are assigned one slot at 
5: 
schools
 S2 ,S3 respectively and removed. The counters of schools s2 and s3 are reduced by one. 
Since there are no slots left at school s2 it is removed. Counters of schools s3 and s4 stay put. 
Vwhs 7 = A 
\ / 
S 4 
cS4(4) = 2 
S3 
Cs3(4) = 1 
Iljxuh 7 
There is only one cycle in Step 4: (sA,i8). Therefore student i8 is assigned one slot at school 
S4 and removed. There are no remaining students so the algorithm terminates. Altogether the 
matching it induces is 
# 
h i2 h k h k il is 
S 2 S i S3 S3 S i S4 S2 S 4 $ 
. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
Consider the top trading cycles algorithm. Any student who leaves at Step 1 is assigned her 
top choice and cannot be made better off. Any student who leaves at Step 2 is assigned her top 
choice among those seats remaining at Step 2 and since preferences are strict she cannot be made 
better off without hurting someone who left at Step 1. Proceeding in a similar way, no student 
can be made better off without hurting someone who left at an earlier step. Therefore the top 
trading cycles mechanism is Pareto efficient. 
The proof Proposition 4 is similar to the proof of a parallel result in Abdulkadiroglu and 
Sonmez (1999).19 The following lemma is the key to the proof. 
LEMMA: Fix the announced preferences of all students except i at Q-i = (Qj)jeI\{i}. Suppose 
that in the algorithm student i is removed at Step T under Q* and at Step T* under Q*. Suppose 
19Papai [2000] independently proves a similar result for a wider class of mechanisms. 
5; 
T <T*. Then the remaining students and schools at the beginning of Step T are the same 
whether student i announces Qi or Q*. 
PROOF OF LEMMA: 
Since student i fails to participates in a cycle prior to Step T in either case, the same cycles 
form and therefore the same students and schools are removed before Step T. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: 
Consider a student i with true preferences p . Fix an announced preference profile Q_; = 
(Qj)jei\{i] for every student except i. We want to show that revealing her true preferences P is 
at least as good as announcing any other preferences Qi. Let T be the step at which student i 
leaves under Qi} (s,h,Sl,..., sk,i) be the cycle she joins, and thus school s be her assignment. 
Let T* be the step at which she leaves under her true preferences Pi. We want to show that her 
assignment under Pi is at least as good as school s. We have two cases to consider. 
Case 1: T* >T. 
Suppose student i announces her true preferences Pi. Consider Step T. By the Lemma, the 
same students and schools remain in the market at the beginning of this step whether student i 
announces Qi or p . Therefore at Step T, school s points to student h, student h points to school 
si, . . . , school sk points to student i. Moreover, they keep doing so as long as student i remains. 
Since student i truthfully points to her best remaining choice at each step, she either receives an 
assignment that is at least as good as school s or eventually joins the cycle (s, h,Sl,..., sk, i) and 
assigned a slot at school s. 
Case 2: T* < T. 
By the Lemma the same schools remain in the algorithm at the beginning of Step T* whether 
student i announces Qi or p. Moreover, student i is assigned a seat at her best choice school re-
maining at Step T* under p . Therefore, in this case too her assignment under the true preferences 
Pi is at least as good as school s. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: 
Immediately follows from Abdulkadiroglu (2002) and a self-contained proof is available upon 
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request. The original strategy-proofness result by Dubins and Freeman (1981) and Roth (1982) 
directly carries over to the case with two types of students since the modified mechanism is a 
direct application of the original mechanism as explained in Section III.A. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: 
Consider the modified top trading cycles algorithm. Any student who leaves at Step 1 is 
assigned her top choice and cannot be made better off. Any student who leaves at Step 2 is 
assigned her top choice among those schools which has room for her type at Step 2 and since 
preferences are strict she cannot be made better off without hurting someone who left at Step 
1. Proceeding in a similar way, no student can be made better off without hurting someone who 
left at an earlier step. Therefore the top trading cycles mechanism with type-specific quotas is 
constrained efficient. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7: 
The Lemma preceding the proof of Proposition 4 as well as its proof are valid for the modified 
mechanism. Moreover the basic elements of the proof of Proposition 4 carry over as well. 
Consider a student i with true preferences p . Fix an announced preference profile Q_; = 
(Qj)jei\{i} for every student except i. We want to show that revealing her true preferences P is 
at least as good as announcing any other preferences Q*. Let T be the step at which student i 
leaves under Qi} (s,h,Sl,..., sk,i) be the cycle she joins, and thus school s be her assignment. 
Let T* be the step at which she leaves under her true preferences p . We want to show that her 
assignment under P is at least as good as school s. We have two cases to consider. 
Case 1: T* >T. 
Suppose student i announces her true preferences p . Consider Step T. By the Lemma, the 
same students and schools remain in the market at the beginning of this step whether student i 
announces Qi or p . Therefore at Step T, school s points to student h, student h points to school 
si, . . . , school sk points to student i. Moreover, they keep doing so as long as student i remains. 
But at each step student i truthfully points to her best choice among schools with an available 
seat for her type. Therefore she either receives an assignment that is at least as good as school s 
or eventually joins the cycle (s, h,
 Sl,..., sk,i) and assigned a slot at school s. 
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Fdvh 5= WW ? W1 
E | wkh Ohppd wkh vdph vfkrrov uhpdlq lq wkh dojrulwkp dw wkh ehjlqqlqj r i Vwhs WW zkhwkhu 
vwxghqw l dqqrxqfhv T l ru Sl1 Pruhryhu/ vwxghqw l lv dvvljqhg d vhdw dw khu ehvw fkrlfh d p r q j 
vfkrrov zlwk dq dydlodeoh vhdw iru khu w|sh uhpdlqlqj dw Vwhs WW xqghu Sl1 Wkhuhiruh/ lq wklv fdvh 
wrr khu dvvljqphqw xqghu wkh wuxh suhihuhqfhv S l lv dw ohdvw dv j r r g dv vfkrro v1 
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Figure Legends: 
Figure 1: Top Trading Cycles Algorithm: Step 1 
Figure 2: Top Trading Cycles Algorithm: Step 2 
Figure 3: Top Trading Cycles Algorithm: Step 3 
Figure 4: Top Trading Cycles Algorithm: Step 4 
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